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Hegemony and the Sixties: Observations,
Polemics, Meanderings
Anthony Ashbolt
The concept of cultural hegemony and the 1960s are interconnected in important
ways. First, it was in the 1960s that a keen interest in the concept developed. Second,
the battle for cultural hegemony today takes place in the shadow of the sixties. The
neoconservative agenda has been developed with reference to Vietnam and the
liberation movements of the 1960s. The neoconservatives certainly saw sixties
radicalism as a challenge to power and privilege. Ironically, some on the Left now beg
to disagree and see the radical sixties, in particular the counterculture, as paving the
way for a new phase of consumer capitalism. This paper argues that despite the
contradictions of cultural radicalism, there were genuine challenges to hegemony in
the sixties and that it is important to keep alive the Utopian spirit of radicalism in
that period.
Key Words: Hegemony, 1960s, Radicalism, Counterculture, Neoconservatives
It was in the 1960s that great interest in the work of Antonio Gramsci, and specifically
the theory of ideological or cultural hegemony, was sown in the West. In 1957, two
translations of Gramsci’s writings were published yet, despite contributions from
Howard Stuart Hughes (1959, 99/104) and Gwyn Williams (1960, 586/99), it was not
until a series of articles in New Left Review and the publication of John Cammett’s
Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (1967) that he began to be
more widely appreciated (Anderson 1976/7, 7; Genovese 1970, 284/316). Within
Australia (but also internationally), Alastair Davidson helped pave the way with
various articles, a booklet, and later a book (Davidson 1964, 1965, 1968, 1977). It is
ironic that the Gramscian concept of hegemony rose to prominence in the sixties, as
the struggles of that decade underpin the current attempt to cement a neoconserva-
tive hegemony.
Until the 1960s the word ‘‘hegemony,’’ if used at all, was a synonym for
imperialism. This ‘‘commonsensical’’ usage has returned with vigor more recently,
reflecting both America’s status as the sole superpower and the bellicose policy
drafted by the neocons. Strange bedfellows Noam Chomsky (2003) and Owen Harries
(2004) use hegemony as imperialism, rather than in a Gramscian sense, yet the two
distinct uses of the term need not be seen as totally separate. They are, indeed,
dialectically interrelated. U.S. hegemony abroad is also, and always was, about
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home, but elements of both can be found in the imperial project and domestic
policies. The ‘‘hearts and minds’’ policy in Vietnam, now being replicated in Iraq, was
and is insane, but it reflects the very way the two senses of hegemony are bound
together. Discussions of hegemony today, whether concerned with imperialism or with
the reproduction of capitalist social relations domestically, resonate (both con-
sciously and unconsciously) with the politics and culture of the sixties. This article
examines the concept of hegemony through the lens of the sixties. First, the scene
will be set by examining the contemporary context wherein the sixties is an ever
present force. Second, various critiques of sixties radicalism will be examined to
assess whether the movements of the period were genuinely counterhegemonic or if
they simply prepared the way for the latest stage of consumer capitalism.
The Imagined Sixties
Not too far behind the surface of contemporary policymaking in America lurk the
sixties. The first wave of neoconservatives rose to prominence in the 1970s as part of
a backlash against what they alleged to be sixties excess*/in particular, libertine
values that undermined the bedrocks of religion, family, and community. Connected
with this reaction was an attempt to reinvigorate American power abroad, highlighted
most clearly in the Committee on the Present Danger and its warnings about American
decline (Podhoretz 1980). The Kristols and the Podhoretzes sent forth their young,
and thus it was that a new wave of neocons took center stage and began running the
asylum. Their agenda was underpinned by the sixties: by black, women’s, and gay
liberation, by alternative theories on education and social organization and everyday
life*/above all, by Vietnam. In social policy, the neocons or their spiritual advisors
want to roll back modernity generally, and sixties morality specifically, while in
foreign policy Vietnam is a constant, haunting memory that fuels a ‘‘never again will
we be defeated’’ mentality. In that way, Vietnam is not remembered; it is simply used
as a bludgeon to bash a Democratic nominee for president, discredit the antiwar
movement, and set the framework for policy reversals in fields like abortion rights for
women.
The attempt to construct an alternative society in the 1960s, to develop counter-
institutions or to fashion a new way of life, was always regarded with scorn by
conservative ideologues. It was seen as self-indulgence masquerading as social
protest. Daniel Boorstin (1968, 121/34) characterized the new spirit of rebellion as
one that stressed ‘‘sensation’’ rather than experience and instant gratification rather
than long-term vision. Similar propositions were put forward by other established
scholars like Lewis Feuer (1969) and Edward Shils (1988). Feuer’s study of student
movements focused on generational underpinnings of rebellion, with radical
commitment being seen as one moment or passage in life.
Like Boorstin, Feuer saw the young radicals’ commitment to community as
essentially fake. Boorstin suggested they ‘‘deny any substantial community*/even
among their own ‘members’’’ (1968, 128). Feuer noted that ‘‘it was a remarkable



















Laureate in Physics marching in new found community with a nonstudent ‘drop-out’
activist’’ (1969, 472), and suggested that young radicals would use issues as a pretext
for forging a ‘‘community of the young’’ (465). Writing somewhat later, Shils viewed
the radical commitment to ‘‘self-determination’’ as little more than a celebration of
the individual who lived outside any traditions or conventions (1988, 14/5). Allan
Bloom (1987, 313/35) saw things in a similar fashion, and left readers of his best-
seller in little doubt that sixties radicalism was a primary factor in the decay of
American higher education. This sort of perception is not confined to conservatives.
More recently, Stephen Ambrose (1995, v) lamented the failure of radicals in the
sixties to establish a political party of the lLeft. Instead, they rushed into a series of
self-destructive indulgences devoted purely to pleasure. This, however, is conserva-
tive critique with a radical pose and others have developed a more authentically
leftist analysis.
Most famously, Thomas Frank (1997) has detailed the degree to which advertising
gurus and marketeers generally were hep to the jive, rendering the counterculture a
moment in the growth of consumer capitalism. To some degree, Frank was
specifically reacting against a turn in cultural studies toward consumption over
production and the valorization of various practises as counterhegemonic. As interest
in hegemony grew during the 1970s, there was a gradual shift in thinking away from a
focus on cultural cohesion under capitalism toward resistances to it (Harris 1992).
Paradoxically, this shift reflected a Left in retreat, particularly retreat to the
academy. Having awakened from the Utopian dreams of revolution in the 1960s,
sections of the academic left sought solace in self-justifying theory: theory that
elevated personal tastes and habits to a state of critical practice (Frank 2001,
276/306; Jacoby 1999, 67/99; Lodziak 2002, 11/30; Mulhern 1995, 31/40; McChesney
1996, 1/10). Television watching became an act of resistance and so, too, shopping
and, indeed, anything that took one’s fancy and helped soothe the pain of dashed
desires. The risk of valorizing practises that sustain rather than confront hegemony is
evident. In avoiding that risk, some critics have imagined that neoliberalism is
somehow an outgrowth of sixties radicalism. This, however, is a misperception that at
times reflects directly conservative critiques of the sixties. Clive Hamilton does
detect sinister seeds in the sixties.
It is now becoming clear that the Sixties generation tilled the ground for the
neoliberal reforms and ‘‘turbo-capitalism’’ of the 1980s and 1990s. Railing
against the conventions of their parents, the counter-culture tore down the
social structures of conservatism that, for all their stultifying oppressive-
ness, held the market in check. The demands for freedom in private life,
freedom from the fetters of career and family, and for freedom of sexual
expression were noble in themselves, but it is now evident that the
demolition of customary social structures did not create a society of free
individuals. Instead, it created an opportunity for the marketers to
substitute material consumption and manufactured lifestyles for the ties
of social tradition. (2003, 109/10)
There is some merit in this argument, but it is eclipsed by faulty reasoning. First, it




















mentality. Moreover, elements of almost any social tendency can be used for purposes
contrary to the intention. As the Situationists understood, even protest against the
society of the spectacle can be incorporated by the spectacle. And Hamilton’s
argument tends toward silliness when he states that ‘‘Margaret Thatcher should be
thankful to Alan [sic ] Ginsberg and Timothy Leary’’ for their contributions to the
destruction of social conventions that checked the power of the market (2003, 111).
Leary, it must be acknowledged, was no radical and the same can be said of the drug
culture generally. Ginsberg, however, was (at least periodically) an eloquent
champion of causes, and his political weaknesses flow less from his assistance
(pace Hamilton, of a very limited kind) in laying the foundations of neoliberalism than
from his tendency toward a pacifist therapeutic mode of resistance. The problem
with the Frank and Hamilton propositions is that they are (or can be seen as) simple
and unilinear while things do not work that neatly. Evidence to the contrary is simply
missed, buried, or judged as irrelevant. Take, for example, the countercultural
rejection of career. This, so it seems, paved the way for a flexible labor market: nice
try, but the two are disconnected. There is not even much suggestion of a mirror. The
fact that tendencies within the counterculture can sometimes seem to reappear in
different guise, responding to different social pressures and different ideas, does not
establish direct connections. It can and does reveal contradictions within cultural
radicalism, and it is to these contradictions that I now turn.
The Radical Sixties
Cultural radicals in the 1960s formulated a living critique of bourgeois society, an at
times potent critique that signified the possibilities of a creative alternative. The
intense subjectivity of that critique, which contributed to the dominance of style
in everyday expression and social protest, generated numerous compromises
with spectacular consumer culture. This sort of contradiction is not peculiar to
radical subcultures, but rather, can be observed in subcultures generally, and also the
avant-garde. As Guy Debord noted:
Dadaism and Surrealism are the two currents which mark the end of modern
art. They are contemporaries, though only in a relatively conscious manner,
of the last great assault of the revolutionary proletarian movement; and the
defeat of this movement, which left them imprisoned in the same artistic
field whose decrepitude they had announced, is the basic reason for their
immobilization . . . Dadaism wanted to suppress art without realizing it ;
surrealism wanted to realize art without suppressing it. (1977, 191;
emphasis in original)
Working-class youth subcultures in England after 1945 attempted to combine
elements of traditional working-class culture*/in particular, argot and habit, with
elements of the dominant culture*/in particular, commodity fetishism. Traditional
styles of speech and behavior were mediated by new styles of dress, the possession of
accoutrements like bikes (the function of which was partly symbolic), and the worship




















simultaneously reaffirmed and escaped; problems of adjustment to the social order
were resolved in an imaginary way, and rebellion was thus contained (Clarke et al.
1976, 47/8). This is similar to the contiguous adjustment and rebellion witnessed by
Paul Willis (1977) in the classrooms of working-class schools. The very adoption of
rebellion in the classroom reflected an anti-intellectualism that helped confirm the
pupils’ working-class status. They thus learned to labor partly by rejecting schooling
itself.
Cultural rebellion can function (much as Frank and Hamilton imagine regarding the
sixties) as the avant-garde of bourgeois life-style innovation. This was partly true of
the 1920s, when American youth proudly challenged cultural conventions but
remained politically conservative (Fass 1977, 292/329). Transformations in the
cultural realm then suggested more a refashioning of life style to accord with a
new era of capitalism than the construction of an opposition. The increasing
prominence of advertising in the 1920s helped rivet youthful experimentation to
market trends in fashion (Ewen 1976; Lears 1983, 3/38). To some extent, the way for
this development had been paved by the Greenwich Village radicals whose
bohemianism combined uneasily with socialism and feminism (Fishbein 1982; Stansell
2000). Instead of prefiguring Utopia, perhaps they provided life-style examples for
the indigent bourgeois. Yet, that is an overly cynical perspective because they, too,
were caught up in contradictions, and later developments did not negate (or simply
absorb) their own significant contributions.
Cultural transformations in the period after the Second World War tended to assist
a new dynamic of capital accumulation centered on consumerism. Television was
significant in this (particularly through the creation of the teenager) but so, too, was
the development of suburbia. This is not, however, to suggest that all manifestations
of cultural change were functional, automatically, to the capitalist system, but rather
to place them within an overall context of shifting patterns of consumption and
leisure. In reviewing Jack Kerouac’s The Dharma Bums, a commentator for the Wall
Street Journal speculated that the Japhy Ryder character would soon settle down
comfortably in middle America as ‘‘an account executive or a book-editor with too-
expensive family, a white Jaguar, a collection of Maxwell Bodenheim poems,
a Hammond organ, a hi-fi set and a mild delusion he is somehow shaping the world’’
(quoted in Jezer 1982, 273). Yet the real-life Japhy Ryder was beat poet Gary Snyder;
he was to become a prominent participant in the Haight-Ashbury experiment, and has
never severed his close ties to the American radical tradition. Predicted compro-
mises, sellouts, and capitulations do not always prove accurate.
Those who fail to acknowledge the contradictions see only one side of the story.
Thus folk music aficionado Irwin Silber once argued that the capitalist system needed
‘‘the cultural revolution’’ (1970, 11). There is some truth to this. Things that might
have been initially threatening to the Establishment, like rock music, very quickly
became part of the Establishment. This is because they challenged the sort of decent
social standards that restrained the consumerist dynamic within capitalism. More
flexible social values were required by the new capitalism, and it just so happens that
radical subcultures helped fashion them. They engaged in other activities as well,
however, ones not so easily identified with the latest stage of capital accumulation.




















or necessary to its latest stage, does not mean that they are intrinsically
compromised. Capitalism, after all, can possess progressive characteristics. An
understanding of the limitations of, and contradictions within, cultural radicalism
historically can help us to avoid exaggerating the potentialities of cultural radicalism
today. It can also warn against its summary dismissal.
Silber put it well when he noted that ‘‘the capitalist system transforms the energy
and vitality of the radical movement into its own social necessity’’ (11). Thus hippies
ostensibly despised the culture of consumption, yet embraced some of its tendencies.
New York’s Lower East Side Feminist Collective singled out a glaring contradiction:
‘‘hip culture imprisons women in the name of freedom and exploits women in the
name of love’’ (1970, 39). In much the same way, Herbert Marcuse argued in 1967 that
the tribal focus of hippies actually tended to spawn new forms of repression and
selfishness, which mirrored the dominant culture. But his reported suggestion that
‘‘the community can become acute only after the advent of social change and not
before’’ suggested a rejection of prefigurative politics (quoted in the Berkeley Barb,
4/10 August 1967). Moreover, it established a standard differentiation between
before and after, a weakness in strategic thinking highlighted by Gramsci’s stressing
of the need to cement counterhegemonic processes in civil society before any
revolutionary assault on the state. That should not blind us to the strengths in
Marcuse’s overall analysis, strengths that partly revolve around his injection of
psychoanalytic theory into Marxism. Thus it was Marcuse (1955), more than Gramsci,
who understood that repression was not simply an institutional phenomenon and that
consequently every revolution historically had been betrayed because it threw up
structures of control similar to those dispensed with. Yet even Marcuse was to rethink
his early negative perspective on the counterculture, as evidenced by later works, An
Essay on Liberation (1969) and Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972).
Regular genuflection at the altar of commodity fetishism mediated the hippie
critique of plastic, prefabricated, fast-frozen society; the critique, however,
persisted. Processes of incorporation and negation did not always succeed in blunting
the critical edge of cultural radicalism. Susan Krieger (1979) has studied the ways in
which San Francisco’s hip radio station KMPX was coopted in the late 1960s. Yet KMPX
was never particularly radical; it simply programmed the new music that other
stations shunned. Experiments at the edges of mainstream culture should not
therefore be confused with projects that offer genuine challenges. Marcuse’s
warnings about sexual rebellion are, however, more generally applicable to
radicalism. Desublimation can be repressive rather than liberating (Marcuse 1972,
57/77) and so, too, the smashing of tradition can simply foster insidious new means of
control and regulation. Hippies did arguably help unleash a process of ‘‘profound
cultural disintegration and transformation’’ (Flacks 1971, 72), but perhaps the final
terms of their endeavor could be set by the society of the spectacle. Antagonism
toward the dominant culture was accompanied by the furtive embrace of that
culture. While their celebration of leisure signaled an escape from bourgeois order
and discipline, Christopher Lasch (1971, 333) argued it also endorsed a bourgeois
vision of Utopia. He did not point out that this bourgeois vision had its own strengths




















All youth subcultures resist, albeit often incoherently, the process which makes
them part of the parent culture and, in that way, they reveal and act upon
contradictions in that culture (Cohen 1972, 23). The social world confronted by the
counterculture was itself suffused with contradictions: there was the glamour of the
spectacle and the turgid sameness of life itself; the idolization of the individual and
the triumph of mass society; the pursuit of happiness and the reification of pleasure;
the reliance upon collective will (expressed cogently by the ideology of consensus)
and the replacement of that will by images of politics and life manufactured by the
mass media. The subcultural response to the contradictions was framed primarily at
the level of style and symbol. Style was a key fact because it enabled ‘‘the
communication of significant difference’’ (even if at times an illusory difference) and
thus of a group identity (Hebdige 1979, 102). As Stuart Hall once suggested, to some
extent hippies ‘‘made the question of style itself a political issue’’ (1969, 194). Their
life-style politics partly involved an endeavor to both reclaim urban community and
strike out for the wilderness.This was prefaced by a critique of the Faustian ideals of
progress that had increasingly ruptured human community and distanced people from
the natural environment (Stent 1978, 15/33, 71/6). The fact that this critique was
somewhat incoherent does not lessen its significance. If anything, it reaffirms the
oppositional trajectory of much countercultural thought and practice.
John Sanbomatsu has developed a critique of what he calls ‘‘the expressivist
aesthetic’’ in sixties radicalism. It is this aesthetic (or, following Russel Jacoby [1975,
101/18], what could be called ‘‘the politics of subjectivity’’) that supposedly
underpinned both radical activism and radical theory in the period. Sanbomatsu
(2004, 21/50) reveals little interest in the activism, preferring to focus on the ideas.
This, however, is problematic as for many there was a dialectical relation between
the two. Thus the stress on feeling, on personal authenticity, on moral commitment,
arose directly out of experiences within the civil rights movement. Without that
movement connection, it can seem like therapeutic babble. Along with Julie Stephens
(1998), Sanbomatsu sees postmodernism emerging out of sixties radicalism. Unlike
Stephens, however, he is not concerned specifically with the protest activity. This is
peculiar, given his overall project of resuscitating Gramsci.
You cannot hope to assess the legacy of the sixties from a Gramscian perspective
without confronting the many attempts to develop counterinstitutions, alternative
communities, the underground press, ‘‘free spaces’’ generally (Evans and Boyte 1982,
55/65; 1986). These could be seen as concrete elements in a somewhat under-
developed war of position, elements arguably weakened by an ‘‘expressivist
aesthetic,’’ but still ones that offered a challenge to the dominant culture. Where
Stephens reports glowingly on the playful politics of subversion in groups like the
Diggers, Sanbomatsu fails to address particular projects in any detail and thus tends
to rely upon generalization. The Diggers do not rate a mention, but in a telling
passage the Yippies do.
The expressivist aesthetic enabled a qualitative deepening of commodity
logics in the lifeworld. Foucault’s call for an ethic of ‘‘care of the self’’
would become the rallying cry of global capitalism, which was happy to




















niche markets. The Yippie cry ‘‘Do It!’’ had been transformed by the Nike
Corporation’s detournement into ‘‘Just Do It!’’ while banks put up
expressivist billboard ads like ‘‘Use your American Express Card. Win prizes.
Scream uncontrollably.’’ (Sanbomatsu 2004, 49/50)
Dastardly clever thing, this capitalism. And to think that sixties radicals furnished it
with new slogans and styles, spectacularizing the very spectacle they sought to
overthrow. Sanbomatsu recognizes that this is only one side of the story (in actuality,
it is much less than that); a slightly earlier passage brings out the strengths of ‘‘the
expressivist cultural habitus,’’ its unleashing of potent forces of imagination, and its
exposure of systems of control and regulation in the fabric of everyday life (2004, 49).
It did this and it ushered in a new stage of hypercapitalism? Not quite.
While Sanbomatsu is right to point to links, they are neither direct nor causative
but, rather, indicative of consumerism’s power to incorporate almost anything. Take
this ad for a retirement village: ‘‘In the sixties your generation championed some
mighty causes. The Vietnam War, women’s rights, racism, the environment . . . you
challenged each and changed the world for the better in the process. Now as you hit
50 you realize that there is one last wrong that needs to be righted.’’
The Retirement Village
This publicity for Aurora Developments does not constitute proof that sixties
radicalism opened the way for retirement villages. Old age and the entrepreneurial
spirit might have had something to do with that. Yes, the ad is tongue in cheek with a
dash of surrealism and a splice of merry pranksterism, but then, advertising
copywriters can be clever and can even draw on oppositional (or sometimes
pseudo-oppositional) currents to sell their concepts. A slogan like ‘‘Do It!’’ was less
a call to arms than the title of a book by Jerry Rubin. Nike’s use of the slogan (if there
is, indeed, a direct connection) proves nothing but the capacity of spectacular society
to transform any image or concept into something functional. Did the antiglobalizers
create the dynamic whereby even images of shops being trashed could be used as
selling points by the shops themselves? Here we are dealing with processes over which
oppositional movements can exert no real power. There are, however, instances
where such movements do directly compromise their opposition or exhibit contra-
dictory tendencies. Compromise can be seen in the sixties hippie marketplace. Ron
Thelin (1968), proprietor of the Haight-Ashbury Psychedelic Shop, once made the
following plea on behalf of Zen finance capital: ‘‘What we are talking about is the
evolution of a new culture, a new civilization. We have to find new means of
exchange . . . I understand that money is energy and it has to flow, it’s a matter of
channelling.’’
Needless to say, Thelin and other hip proprietors did little to galvanize a
counterhegemonic spirit in the hippie communities. This was left to groups like the
Diggers, but even they were suffused with contradictions. Thus, the Digger ideology



















less obsessed with material wealth, less voracious in its appetite to turn everything
into a commodity. Yet the free store, or free food in the park, or the rituals of money
burning (also used by Yippies) were activities fueled by the booming economic
conditions. Moreover, these counterinstitutions and rituals could display a marked
insensitivity to the needs of the poor. One day some black women from the Fillmore
District came into the Free Store and were surprised to hear everything was free and
that they could take what they needed. The women began to carry out piles of clothes
from the racks until a worried Digger stressed they should only ‘‘take what they
need.’’ One woman responded tartly, ‘‘We can sell it to make money. We need the
money’’ (Forman 1979; Forman quoted in Morris and Merton 1987, 220).
Evidence of aesthetic expressivism does abound in Digger ideology. The Digger
Papers opines, ‘‘So a store of goods or clinic or restaurant that is free becomes a
social art form. Ticketless theater,’’ nonetheless, the Diggers’ Free City program
resonated with the spirit of counterhegemonic practice, including free schools,
hospitals, and housing (n.d, 3/17).
Conclusion: The Sixties as Cultural Battleground
Actual and projected counterinstitutions were a vital part of sixties radicalism and
not all of them tilled the soil for rampant consumerism. Many were significant
breeding grounds for activists in the civil rights, antiwar, women’s liberation, and
environmental movements. They failed in their revolutionary endeavors, but their
dreams of revolution kept alive a sense of Utopian possibilities, and it was this sense
that encouraged experimentation with the idea of the good society. As noted, the
ideas and the activism often reflected contradictions. This is but one reason
generalizations about sixties radicalism have to be treated carefully. Critics of the
movements tend to ignore, slide past, or reconstruct the actual histories of political
and cultural dissent, and end up providing a caricature. Sanbomatsu (2004) at times
runs that risk, if only because his source material on the period is rather narrow.
Certain forms of cultural radicalism, in particular, were susceptible to distorted
characterization partly because of their internal contradictions. Political radicalism
was itself subject to media hype, whipped-up sloganeering, and personality fetishism.
Tendencies toward subjectivity and therapeutic consciousness were present in the
New Left, even in early treatises like the Port Huron Statement. It needs to be
understood, however, that the subjectivity explored by the New Left was mostly of a
different order from that mulled over within the various cults and therapies that
flourished in the 1970s. It had a definite political framework and was not simply a
quest for personal development. Parallel, counter, or alternative institutions were
central to this framework, but not as units of a grand theory. The escape from
ideology and strategy was signaled early on. Tom Hayden (1961) advocated a
‘‘radicalism of style’’ and a little later (1962) encouraged his fellow new radicals to
‘‘leave the isolated world of ideological fantasy’’ and ‘‘allow your ideas to become



















one crucial source for the later slogan ‘‘the personal is political.’’ Hayden himself
owed a huge intellectual debt to C. Wright Mills (who was, indeed, the subject of
Hayden’s graduate thesis). Mills’s eloquent exploration of the dialectical relation
between the personal and the political can be found in the first chapter of his
1959 book The Sociological Imagination . And there we find a still pertinent warning:
‘‘In every intellectual age some one style of reflection tends to become a common
denominator of cultural life. Nowadays, it is true, many intellectual fads are widely
taken up before they are dropped for new ones in the course of a year or two. Such
enthusiasms may add spice to cultural play, but leave little or no intellectual trace’’
(Mills 1970, 20).
One thinks immediately of sections of the Australian left moving from Lukácsianism
to Althusserianism via Gramsci only to end up with Foucault or Derrida. Yet there is
also that point about ‘‘one style of reflection’’ tending ‘‘to become a common
denominator of cultural life.’’ Here Mills, apart from sounding somewhat Gramscian,
was predicting the triumph of ‘‘the sociological imagination,’’ an imagination that
promises ‘‘an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connexion with
larger social realities.’’ Instead, of course, our time has been marked by the steady
infiltration of neoliberal ideas and assumptions into the very texture of daily life, The
connection between personal and political is thereby severed except inasmuch as
personal aggrandisement becomes a guiding principle of life.
The sixties have become a whipping boy, held responsible for the breakdown of
the family, the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, the
proliferation of drugs, the general decay of morality, and the decline of patriotic
sentiment. The sixties underpin the war on political correctness and the so-called
culture wars. It underpins war in another sense because, in the wake of defeat in
Vietnam, the culture warriors also turned their attention to American power in the
international arena. War in the future, they implied or just argued, was to be won. No
More Vietnams was stolen from the antiwar movement and turned into its opposite.
Guevara’s call for ‘‘one, two, three, many’’ Vietnams now seems somewhat chilling.
Iraq is not Vietnam; that is hardly a surprising geographical fact. It reverberates,
however, with memories of Vietnam, something the Rumsfelds of this world and their
supporters in journalism and academe do not want brought into focus. Vietnam
amnesia sustains hegemony today, as do negative characterizations of sixties
radicalism.
In struggling for civil rights and against war, radicals in the 1960s also developed
ideas about the good society. Such ideas tend to evoke at best a tolerant nostalgia.
Yet, as Gramsci understood, they are the stuff of politics: ‘‘What ‘ought to be’ is
therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of
reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is
politics’’ (Gramsci 1971, 172). These days, pessimism of the intellect feeds pessimism
of the will. Dreams of the good society have melted before a barrage of claims that no
alternative exists. The task of confronting hegemony is also the task of reviving
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